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The Private and the Public Domains
Rousasj Rushdoonyt
Some years ago, I spoke at the University of Notre Dame Law School
on The State as an Establishment of Religion, subsequently published in Freedom
and Education: Pierce v. Society of Sisters Reconsidered.1 At that conference,
I met Edward J. Murphy, at that time dean of the law school. We at once
found it eminently easy to converse because we both shared a belief in the
necessity for a theological perspective in every area of life and thought. We
both believed that theology must always be, as it has been, Queen of the
Sciences. Because God is the Creator and Governor over all things, it nec-
essarily follows that all things are of necessity under His ordination and to
be understood only in terms of Him.
Thus, despite my thoroughly Calvinistic world and life faith, and Ed-
ward Murphy's equally strong Roman Catholic faith, we quickly found that
we had much in common. Subsequently, Edward Murphy wrote for the
Chalcedon Foundation's Ross House books his study of In Your Justice,2
which is still happily carried by us. He expressed interest in writing a study
of theology, and he shared with me several writings, including one on the
atonement. I urged him to continue his work by developing the implica-
tions of Biblical doctrine for law, but he did not find time to do so. Harold
J. Berman, in Law and Revolution, had done this brilliantly for the atone-
ment.3 Anselm's work had led to the application to law of Christ's atone-
ment, namely, that Christ's atoning death, a restitution to God for our sins,
required the premise of restitution civilly and religiously. The result was a
revolution in law which superbly reshaped Christendom. Only now are we
seeing an anti-Christian legal revolution which is undermining that Chris-
tian triumph. One can add that it is undermining Justinian's legal work
and also that of Theodora, whose Christian premises have governed family
law until our time.
The theological premises of all laws are more than a medieval, or a
Calvinist, matter: they are basic to the concept of Christendom. More,
they are basic to the idea of law. One of the unhappy facts about our pres-
ent era is its disregard for the past, and its impatience with definitions.
The past is seen as an era of religious bigotry (we live in a very bigoted
time), of religious persecution and murders (although our century has
seen the highest percentage of mankind perish from mass murders, death
marches, death camps, slavery, starvation, epidemics and political oppres-
* President, The Chalcedon Foundation.
1 RousasJ. Rushdoony, The State as an Establishment of Religion, in FREEDOM AND EDUCATION:
P=ircs v. SocjiE oF SkSrER SRECONSIDERED 37 (Donald P. Kommers & MichaelJ. Wahoski eds.,
1978).
2 EDWARDJ. MuRPHY, IN YOURJUSTICE (1982).
3 HARoLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLUTION (1983).
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sion, all without the help of the church),4 of race hatred and conflict,
political hostilities, wars of unprecedented destructive power and hatred,
and so on. Our age's self-congratulations are not in order, but our human-
istic overlords are convinced that, once Christianity was shoved into the
closet, the age of peace and innocence was surely dawning. By definition,
we are the age of light. One is reminded of St. Paul's comment that, in a
time of falsity and deceit, "Satan himself is transformed into an angel of
light."5
Law has been redefined to mean what the state decrees. The Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, in its first edition, 1771, began its study of law with a
brief definition: "Law may be defined, 'The command of the sovereign
power, containing a common rule of life for the subjects.' 6 For us, the
sovereign power is not the state but God. We have forgotten that; for the
Puritan mind, in terms of a centuries old tradition, sovereign meant Lord or
God, and sovereignty was an attribute of God alone. On the Jubilee of the
Constitution in New York City on April 30, 1839, former President John
Quincy Adams spoke at length on the meaning of sovereignty by the state
as against freedom. The English lawyers held Parliament to be omnipotent
because sovereign. As against the omnipotence of Parliament, the colo-
nists appealed to the omnipotence of God.
The revolution under which they were gasping for life, the war which was
carrying desolation into all their dwellings, and mourning into every fam-
ily, had been kindled by the abuse of power-the power of government.
An invincible repugnance to the delegation of power, had thus been gen-
erated, by the very course of events which had rendered it necessary; and
the more indispensable it became, the more awakened was the jealousy
and the more intense was the distrust by which it was to be
circumscribed. 7
Adams, as a Unitarian, was at times fuzzy in his theology, but enough of his
puritan heritage remained with him for him to conclude,
There is the Declaration of Independence, and there is the Constitution
of the United States-let them speak for themselves. The grossly im-
moral and dishonest doctrine of despotic state sovereignty, the exclusive
judge of its own obligations, and responsible to no power on earth or in
heaven, for the violation of them, is not there. The Declaration says it is
not in me. The Constitution says it is not in me.8
A like speech today would not be understood. We have returned to
the pagan doctrine of the state as sovereign which contains and compre-
hends all spheres and areas of life within itself. This doctrine will in time
hold the church to be no more than an aspect of the life of the state if it is
at all tolerated. We must remember that the word liturgy in its origin
4 See GI. ELIOT, TWENTIETH CENTURY BOOK OF THE DEAD (1972).
5 2 Cor. 11:14.
6 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 882 (1771).
7 John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution (April 30, 1839), in AMERiCAN PATRI-
OTIsM at 313-14 (Selmin H. Peabody ed., 1880).
8 Id. at 321.
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meant a public wor* because religion was simply a department of state and
public morale.
The pagan state saw religion as a private matter, hence the multiplicity
of religions recognized and controlled by such a state as Rome. The public
arena was the state. The great revolution wrought by Christianity through
the medieval church, Calvinism, and the Counter-Reformation, was to in-
sist that the supremely public domain is that of Christianity and the church.
The faith cannot become a private matter without a denial of Christianity,
or a reduction of it to one of the ancient mystery religions-another way of
destroying the church and the faith.
But a revolution has occurred. We see it most obviously in certain
areas, such as sexual morality, now held to be simply a private matter and
of no concern to society or to the state. In fact, many object to efforts to
further chastity or to condemn homosexuality because it is held that one's
decisions here are purely private matters and to insist on a Christian stand
is to attempt to force on to the public arena a private concern. The same is
true of abortion: Pro-abortion women are often uncomprehending, and
they see it as radically wrong to legislate with regard to their bodies. "Our
bodies" are held to be a purely private domain, and therefore they are
immune to legislation in any just social order.
The erosion of the belief that Christianity, not the state, defines the
public domain is so severe that churchmen and church members all too
often act on the premise that the state is the true public domain and the
sole governor thereof. We no longer have a theology of the state, only
political philosophies which are essentially humanistic.
But if the triune God is indeed the Creator of heaven and earth and all
things therein, then the state is not our rule-maker, nor the church's, nor its
own. The state is a derivative institution, an aspect of God's world and or-
der, not its own determiner. No more than any man or woman can choose
to create his or her own sexual values is the state able to determine its own
values, laws, and modes of conduct. Of course, we now teach children in
our state schools to choose their own values, so the collapse of religion and
ethics into the private domain is far gone.
But God alone is the true law-giver because He alone is sovereign. The
temptation in Genesis 3:5 has been rightly called man's original sin: his
desire to be his own god, determining, or knowing for himself, what consti-
tutes good and evil, law and morality. Our culture today wallows in original
sin. Instead of the Biblical "thus saith the Lord," people say, "Well, I
think," or "Ifeel," or, "I don't care what the Bible or the church say, Ithink
... ." We have every man functioning as his own god and law. If a man tells
you that he is a good Catholic, or a good Protestant, it is likely that he has in
too many cases redefined the good church to suit himself.
Now to insist that Christianity defines the public domain in terms of
the Trinity and Scripture means that man is under authority. It is important
to examine that word as it is used in The New Testament. Dynamis in
Greek is translated as authority, also as power, capability, force, ability, and
so on. Otto Betz said, "Originally it meant the seat of government, and
then, equally, someone who was in such a position of authority or
1996]
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strength."9 The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation, and the cross
and resurrection supremely manifest the power of God.
Another word for authority (also for right and power) is exousia in
Greek. It refers to the exercise of authority by a ruler, father, or some
delegated person. Both dynamis and exousia are "related to the work of
Christ, the consequent new ordering of cosmic power-structures and the
empowering of believers."' 0 The implication is that all non-Christian au-
thority is ultimately illegitimate. This does not mean that we have the free-
dom to be lawless in relation to them. St. Paul, for example, counsels
believers who are slaves to avoid insurrection. Having "been bought with a
price, be not ye the slaves of men."" However, "if thou mayest be made
free, use it rather."' 2 Freedom is to be desired, but it is not the only moral
concern.
But the insistence throughout history on some sole moral concern has
led to serious social disruptions. The Throne of authority is not man's con-
science but the sovereign and triune God. It has been Christianity which
has most insisted on the necessity for a clean conscience before God. The
whole concept of confession, in its Roman Catholic and Protestant histo-
ries, has been a history of the examination and the cleansing of the con-
science. This is a radically different concept from that of humanistic
individualism which absolves the conscience of accountability to God or to
man. Since World War II especially, conscience in the Western world has
claimed absolution from all accountability to God. This has been possible
because God and Christianity are now part of the private domain. This is a
tacit assumption that God does not exist and that He is at best a conjectural
idea and of no concern to the functioning of the public domain. The rele-
gation of God to the private domain is seen by some as a charitable and
tolerant act because God is an idea whose influence is not for the best
welfare of society.
Because the state is now the heart and soul of the public domain, it has
replaced God, the church, and Christianity in the minds of men. It is the
state now in whom we live, and move, and have our being. It is the state
which, with its planning and controls, has so replaced God's predestination
that most men wince at the thought of God's plan of predestination, but
live more or less comfortably with the state's plan. After all, the public
domain requires governance and power, whereas the private domain to
which God and Christianity have been reduced must remain as ideas
only-and be grateful for that.
Since Hegel at least, the state has been god walking on earth, the ulti-
mate power and mind in being. This is an old battle which the church has
repeatedly fought, lost, and won. For example, the Council of Constance
ended the Great Schism by imperial power. The three rival popes were
reduced to one, but the price was losing control of the church to the em-
9 Otto Betz, Might, Authority, Throne, in 2 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY OF NEW TES-
TAMENT THEOLOGY 609 (Colin Brown ed. 1976).
10 Betz, Exousia, in 2 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY OF NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY,
supra note 9, at 609.
11 1 Cor. 7:23.
12 1 Cor. 7:21.
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peror and some monarchs, notably the French, and later, the Spanish. The
church was pressured to avoid offense and so turned its attention to the
arts, leading to the Renaissance, and then, by reaction, to the Reformation
and the Counter-Reformation, which, until circa 1660, sought to again
make the church the heart of the public domain. The Enlightenment, with
its priority of Reason, saw the state as the epitome of the rational order and
the legitimate heir of the public domain. With the Enlightenment, the
church, as the private domain, was seen as the anti-Reason realm. Men less
and less concerned themselves with the faith, and they saw the church as
the domain of unreason and emotionalism and hence primarily for women
and children. Since then, the church has become more and more outside
the concerns of men. Now, with the rise of feminism, women seek to take
over the leadership of the church as "rightfully" theirs.
In the 1960s, a rising protest targeted moral judgments by Christians
premised on any moral character or standard. Morality was a matter for
the private domain and a purely personal concern. To object to abortion,
homosexuality, or euthanasia, or to insist that chastity should be promoted
or at least mentioned in sex education courses of study, was held to be an
unwarranted confusion of church and state.
The nature of the rationale behind this has been apparent in numer-
ous works. Alisdair Palmer, in a review of one such book in the English
Spectator, observed,
For the last 2,000 years, the central assumption of Western philo-
sophical thought has been that the path of wisdom leads to righteous-
ness. Almost all moral philosophy has been dedicated to trying to prove
that no one who is fully rational can fail to be good, because truth, good-
ness and rationality are one. 13
Previously, challenges to this assumption came from men who could be
dismissed as mad, such as the Marquis de Sade, Friedrich Nietzsche, and
the like. Now such ideas are promoted routinely by academicians, mem-
bers of the media, artists, and routine citizens of commonplace back-
grounds. Palmer cites the fact that Nietzsche held that "power-worship"
must replace morality, and Bernard Williams denies that power must of
necessity do so. Palmer is not so sure. What neither Palmer nor Williams
fail to consider is why morality should, like religion, be excluded from the
public domain. After all, how people behave very much affects the public
realm, and the consequences of a Hitler or a Stalin commanding that
sphere are very different from the results of King Alfred's rule.
The citation of King Alfred, now a somewhat forgotten figure, is delib-
erate. King Alfred was concerned with two causes. First, he sought to free
his realm from the depredations of Danish invaders. Second, to strengthen
his realm, he insisted that God's law, as given in the Bible, govern his
realm. Dominion or rule was for him a religious fact, and it necessarily
meant that the premises of a particular faith prevail.
13 Alisdair Palmer, The Return of the Antichrist THE SPECTATOR, Sept. 30, 1995, at 45 (reviewing
BERNARD WiIAMs, MAKING SENSE OF HuMANTY (1995)).
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Religion is the "ultimate concern," as Paul Tillich held, and the U.S.
Supreme Court has used his definition. The man-ward aspect of religion is
morality and law, the application of the nature of ultimate Being to life in
all its spheres. In terms of this, men have rightly held that all systems of law
are establishments of religion. The current insistence on "the separation
of church and state" is really the effort to disestablish Christianity as the
religion behind our concepts of law and government and to replace it with
a statist humanism. The new, established and catholic church is the state.
The religious institution in any society is salvific, i.e., it has either the intent
or the power to redeem. This the modern state sees itself as called to do, to
save men and society from all their ills. The church is less and less seen as
the necessary instrument for man's salvation, whereas the state sees itself,
and is seen by many people, as man's hope. It offers man cradle to grave
care, or, as the English state it, from womb to tomb.
Clearly, in this long process of re-paganization whereby religion, Chris-
tianity in particular, has been relegated to the private and therefore nones-
sential sphere, law has been separated from Christianity and assigned to
the state by common opinion.
Christianity has thus been limited to mainly pietistic exercises, per-
sonal devotion and private faith. Because it is a private matter, loyalty to
the church, its creeds and confessions, its hierarchy and its worship, is now
seen by many as a private option. Too many Roman Catholic, Eastern Or-
thodox, and Protestant believers have major differences with their
churches' stands and yet will maintain that they are faithful members by
their own definition.
The two key areas which manifest the religion of a culture are educa-
tion and law. If these are not governed by the faith of the people, then the
professions of faith, Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant, are nominal and
the actual functioning faith is something else, at present, humanism. In
the sphere of education, Catholic and main-line Protestant parochial
schools have retreated significantly. However, a major explosion of Chris-
tian schools and home schooling has taken place.
In the sphere of law, a few starts have been made to think through and
provide a philosophy of the idea of law. The major effort in this area, by a
professor of law in the Netherlands, was the work of the late Herman
Dooyeweerd, most notably in his De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, translated into
English as A New Critique of Theoretical Thought 14 in four volumes. In the
main, positivism, as first set forth by Auguste Comte, has been hostile to the
idea of law. Marxist theory has gone beyond the idea of law to affirm an
ever-changing will of the people via the dictatorship of the proletariat. The
basic question of those concerned with this area of thought is whether or
not the starting point should be a philosophy of law, or a theology of law.
My approach is theological.
There is another aspect to this question. If we see the source of law as
the triune God and His enscriptured word, we logically identify law with
the being of God. God's law expresses His nature, and the all-perfect na-
14 HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, A NEW CRITQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT (David H. Freeman &
William S. Young trans., 1969). In some of my works, I have also dealt with the idea of law.
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ture of God makes it inevitable that His law is unchanging, and it never
contradicts His being. Statist law has no such consistency; its changing and
variable nature witnesses to the changing and unstable nature of the state.
It was Henry VIII who told the Irish, "of our absolute power we be above
the law."' 5 Because Henry VIII was a changing and very fallible man, his
law was equally fallible and unstable. His law expressed his nature, even as
contemporary statist laws express too often the fallen and sinful views of
men. About 1970, a lawyer remarked to me that law was being replaced by
the will of judges; he added that he never knew what the law would be
when he walked into a court. In 1974, Paul Hoffman wrote a study of a
criminal lawyer and gave that man's comment prominence as the book's
title: What the Hell is Justice?6 The law is too often regarded with cynicism
in our time because it lacks any Christian foundation.
Some years ago, J.M. Spier observed that "[t]he Christian philosopher
must start with the revealed truth that the Sovereign Creator has placed his
entire creation under law. The term cosmic law order expresses the fact that
everything created is subject to the laws of God."17 God's laws are, like
God, unchangeable. Man, because he is a creature, is under law, his
Maker's law. Spier further relates that "[n]ot to be under law would be to
be as God. Recall the lying words of the serpent in paradise: 'Do not be
troubled by God's law, elevate yourself above it, and you will be as God.'
But to be like God is unattainable to a creature."' 8
If man is under God, then his every area of life and thought will be
under God. If man is the product of biological and social evolution, as
Henry Jones Ford, then a professor of politics at Princeton in 1915, main-
tained, it logically follows that "[t]he State is the permanent and universal
frame of human existence." 19 Moreover, "Man did not make the State; the
State made Man. Man is born a political being. His Nature was formed by
government, requires government and seeks government."20 Again, Ford
held that "[t]he State is absolute and unconditioned in its relation to its
unit life."21 For Ford, the state had replaced God as man's maker. Such
thinking as Ford represented was prevalent and powerful in the United
States for a generation and more prior to World War I. Given this back-
ground, it is not surprising that in a few decades Robert C. Harvey could
write that "grouphood" was replacing "personhood," and that "[wie are
becoming a culture of un-persons."22 It is no wonder that, in the 1960s,
when rebellious youth sought their "identity," they did so in a radically con-
formist way, with a uniformity of hair and dress styles that depersonalized
them. By denying their faith-heritage, they denied their personhood. We
must remember that, in the medieval era, one Northern European people
15 LAWRENCE STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1529-1642, at 58 (1972).
16 PAUL HOFFMAN, WHAT THE HELL IS JUSTICE (1974).
17 J.M. SPIER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRSTIAN PHILOSOPHY 35 (David H. Freeman trans.,
1954).
18 Id. at 41.
19 HENRYJONES FORD, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE STATE 174 (1915).
20 Id. at 175.
21 Id- at 175-76.
22 ROBERT C. HARVEY, THE RESTLESS HEART, BREAKING THE CYCLE OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 13
(1973).
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declared, "We are men and must have laws."23 Personhood has a religious
foundation in the triune Persons of the Godhead. By trying to ban God
and Christianity, the church and morality and God's law, from the public
domain, the twentieth century has dehumanized man and it has replaced
society with the state.
The Bible and the historic creeds of Christendom have an essential
bearing on law. They witness to the fact of an unchanging order as basic to
law and society.
We have forgotten that in colonial and early American history such
bodies as the Massachusetts General Court and the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses were not legislative bodies but citizens' assemblies to protect and
ensure sound and lawful administration. They did not make laws so much
as to protect law. It would not have occurred to them that Christianity
should occupy the private domain and quietly surrender the world to the
state. For them, the state had as much a duty to be Christian as did the
church, and, for that matter, the family, the school, the arts and sciences,
and all things else. This was the ancient stand of Christendom. A return to
this perspective is a necessary step towards the establishment of a viable
order.
23 Id.
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